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Abstract
This paper contributes to an important recent debate around expected utility and
risk aversion. Rejecting a gamble over a given range of wealth levels imposes a lower
bound on risk aversion. Using this lower bound and empirical evidence on the range
of the risk aversion coeﬃcient, we calibrate the relationship between risk attitudes
over small-stakes and large-stakes gambles. We ﬁnd that rejecting small gambles
is consistent with expected utility, contrary to a recent literature that concludes
that expected utility is fundamentally unﬁt to explain decisions under uncertainty.
Paradoxical behavior is only obtained when calibrations are made in a region of the
parameter space that is not empirically relevant.
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1 Introduction
Within expected utility theory, risk aversion is identiﬁed with the concavity of the Bernoulli
utility function u on wealth w (Arrow (1971), Pratt (1964); see Mas-Colell et al. (1995,
chapter 6)). The expected utility framework has been severely criticized in a recent litera-
ture that concludes that diminishing marginal utility is an utterly implausible explanation
for appreciable risk aversion.1 The basis of the criticism can be best illustrated in Rabin
(2000), who calibrates the relationship between risk attitudes over small and large stakes
gambles under expected utility. Using his results, it is possible to present striking state-
ments of the following kind: if a decision maker is a risk-averse expected utility maximizer
and if he rejects gambles involving small stakes over a large range of wealth levels, then he
will also reject gambles involving large stakes, sometimes with inﬁnite positive returns. For
instance, “suppose that, from any initial wealth level, a person turns down gambles where
she loses $100 or gains $110, each with 50% probability. Then she will turn down 50-50
bets of losing $1,000 or gaining any sum of money,” or “suppose we knew a risk averse
person turns down 50-50 lose $100/ gain $105 bets for any lifetime wealth level less than
$350,000 ...Then we know that from an initial wealth level of $340,000 the person will
turn down a 50-50 bet of losing $4,000 and gaining $635,670.” (Rabin (2000, p. 1282)).
From this paradoxical, even absurd, behavior towards large-stakes gambles, Rabin
(2000) and other authors conclude that expected utility is fundamentally unﬁt to ex-
plain decisions under uncertainty. This paper challenges this conclusion. We show that
the ﬂaw identiﬁed in this literature has little empirical support.2 In particular, we show
that it is the assumption of rejecting small gambles over a large range of wealth levels, and
1See, for example, Hansson (1988), Kandel and Stambaugh (1991), Rabin (2001), Rabin and Thaler
(2001) and other references therein. Samuelson (1963), Machina (1982), Segal and Spivak (1990) and
Epstein (1992) also study various issues that are related to this literature.
2See Watt (2002), who has independently obtained results related to ours.
1not expected utility, that does not typically match real-world behavior. In articulating
our response, it is more useful not to argue whether expected utility is literally true (we
know that it is not, since many violations of its underpinning axioms have been exhibited).
Rather, one should insist on the identiﬁcation of a useful range of empirical applications
where expected utility is a useful model to approximate, explain, and predict behavior.
To be more speciﬁc on Rabin’s criticism, let p be the proposition “agent a is a risk
averse expected utility maximizer,” let q be “agent a turns down the modest-stakes gamble
X for a given range of wealth levels,” and let r stand for “agent a turns down the large-
stakes gamble Y.” Then, Rabin’s statements can be expressed as: if p and q hold, then
so does r. He then convincingly argues that most individuals do not turn down Y. This
amounts to saying that r does not hold. From here, Rabin (2000) jumps to the conclusion
that p does not hold. But this conclusion is not warranted unless q is either tautological
or at least empirically compelling.
The plausibility of q as an assumption is argued in the literature purely by appealing
to the reader’s introspection. Introspection, however, may sometimes be misleading: what
people think they would do in a thought experiment may turn out to be quite diﬀerent from
what they actually do when confronted with a similar real-life situation. Indeed, we shall
see that q is far from being empirically relevant. We report experimental evidence that
supports our claim, but most of the evidence we wish to bring to bear is empirical. In doing
so, we stress a methodological point. In assessing levels of risk aversion, it is important to
study what real economic agents actually do when facing very diﬀerent problems involving
uncertainty. These data sets have been carefully analyzed by empirical economists, who
have estimated the levels of the risk aversion coeﬃcient over a wide range of problems.
Our methodology is the following. Rather than relying on introspection to validate q,w e
ﬁrst investigate the theoretical implications of q on the preferences of the decision maker.
We shall demonstrate that it implies a speciﬁc positive lower bound on the coeﬃcient
of absolute risk aversion, and show how it can be calculated exactly. Indeed, something
beyond strict concavity is being assumed.3
3This is contrary to what is claimed in the literature. For instance, “the calibration theorem is entirely
2After obtaining this lower bound on risk aversion implied by q, the relevant issue is
empirical, that is, the question is whether this bound is broadly consistent with the shape
of the utility functions supported by empirical evidence. We argue that this bound is
often unreasonably high. For instance, the assumption that a person turns down gambles
where she loses $100 or gains $110 for any initial wealth level implies that the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion must go to inﬁnity when wealth goes to inﬁnity, while the assumption
that a 50-50 lose $100/ gain $105 bets is turned down for any lifetime wealth level less
than $350,000 implies a value of the same coeﬃcient no less than 166.6 at $350,000. In
contrast, a vast body of empirical evidence consistently indicates that the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion is estimated to be in the single-digit range.
With the single-digit range of empirically plausible coeﬃcient values in hand, we cal-
ibrate the relationship between risk attitudes over small-stakes and large-stakes gambles.
The important question here, far from obvious a priori, is whether one could still ﬁnd
paradoxes similar to the ones found in Rabin (2000). Our answer is in the negative: we do
not ﬁnd paradoxical rejections of large-stakes gambles. Thus, it follows that paradoxical
behavior is only obtained when calibrations are made in a region of the parameter space
that is not empirically relevant.
In conclusion, within expected utility, the relevance of the criticism when comparing
behavior towards small-stakes and large-stakes gambles relies on the validation of assuming
q. We take the debate to the empirical arena, and we argue that much empirical evidence
contradicts the plausibility of Rabin’s q in a variety of settings. We conclude that expected
utility is often a useful model to explain decision making under uncertainty.
2 Rejecting Small Gambles: Evidence
As explained for example in Segal and Spivak (1990), any expected utility agent with
a diﬀerentiable utility function must accept inﬁnitesimal gambles of positive expected
nonparametric, assuming nothing about the utility function except concavity” (Rabin (2000, p. 1282)).
However, we show that there are large families of concave functions that are being ruled out by q.
3value, because locally these preferences amount to risk neutrality. However, as soon as the
gambles are no longer inﬁnitesimal, but of any ﬁnite size, expected utility is compatible with
both accepting and rejecting small gambles. It is then necessary to perform more powerful
tests to examine the question of the appropriateness of expected utility preferences.
There is much work, both experimental and empirical, concerning the behavior of agents
towards small-stakes gambles under expected utility. We brieﬂy review it next.
2.1 Experimental Evidence
Camerer (1995) provides perhaps the most comprehensive survey of experimental evidence
on individual decision making, virtually gathered in all cases from what may be considered
small-stakes gambles. He ﬁnds substantial support for expected utility. In particular, he
concludes that expected utility appears to be a helpful model to understand the reactions
of individuals to risk observed in experimental data involving small gambles. For instance,
after evaluating the relative performance of diﬀerent theories, he concludes that “the result
is an ‘eﬃcient frontier’ of theories that are more accurate, best ﬁtting, given the number of
patterns they allow. A compilation of 23 data sets from a total of 2,000 subjects making
8,000 choices shows that the following theories are on the eﬃcient frontier: mixed fanning,
prospect theory, expected utility and expected value” (p. 638). He also concludes “that
many subjects obey expected utility and that the lean functional form of expected utility is
more statistically robust to estimation error than more complex functional forms” (p. 640),
and that “more general theories appear to ﬁt better than expected utility since they have
more degrees of freedom, but are not better in predicting new choices” (p. 642).4
4Camerer and Ho (1994) ﬁt data from diﬀerent studies using generalizations of expected utility that
weaken the independence axiom and add only one parameter. They ﬁnd that they often ﬁt better and that
violations of the independence axiom are less systematic when mixtures are presented in compound form.
Loomes and Segal (1994) performs an experimental study that provides evidence of diﬀerent orders of risk
aversion, including local risk neutrality. Hey and Orme (1994) estimate a number of generalizations of the
expected utility preference functional using experimentally generated data involving 100 pairwise choice
questions repeated on two separate occasions. They use likelihood ratio tests and the Akaike information
criterion to distinguish between the various generalizations and to explore their economic superiority. The
paper concludes that, for many subjects, the superiority of several of these generalizations cannot be
4As to the range of risk aversion estimates obtained in experimental studies, the evi-
dence is quite robust. For instance, Holt and Laury (2002) present the results of simple
lottery-choice experiments involving gambles that range from $0.10-$3.85 to a few hundred
dollars. They ﬁnd that regardless of the scale of risk the coeﬃcient of relative risk aver-
sion, rR(w,u), is always below 1.37, and typically between -0.97 and 1.37, in a utility for
money speciﬁcation. They also ﬁnd that many subjects are risk neutral or risk loving for
these small scale risks. In experimental studies of games the estimates of rR(w,u) are also
very low. For instance, Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2000, 2002) examine several asymmet-
ric matching pennies games and private-values auction experiments, respectively. These
experiments also involve very small gambles, and total payoﬀs after all rounds have been
completed typically range from 5 to 20 dollars per individual subject. Their estimates of
rR(w,u) are virtually in all cases below 1, and highly signiﬁcant across treatments and
games: estimates typically range from 0.3 to 0.7, centered around 0.5. The value of 0.5 is
also almost identical to that obtained in many experimental studies of similar nature that
these authors cite.
2.2 Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence on decisions under uncertainty in natural environments is vast, and
not easy to summarize. However, the relevant conclusion for the purposes of our analysis
is again noticeably robust: values of rR(w,u) in the single-digit range appear to rationalize
the reactions to risk in virtually all circumstances examined in the literature. Indeed, the
evidence on the size of rR(w,u) is remarkably consistent across hundreds of studies that
examine the behavior of agents choosing among risky alternatives that greatly diﬀer in the
scale of risk in a broad variety of economic contexts.
We ﬁrst discuss empirical evidence on small gambles in familiar real life situations. We
again ﬁnd that these studies yield low estimates of the risk aversion coeﬃcient. As will
be shown, the magnitudes of the gambles in these studies would certainly appear to be
established.
5negligible for any consumer. We later devote some attention to review studies that involve
larger gambles where the risky alternatives substantially diﬀer in size, circumstances, and
economic environments.
First, as Friedman and Savage (1948) already noted, individuals often accept, rather
than reject, small gambles and often do both. “People not only engage in fair games of
chance, they engage freely and often eagerly in such unfair games as lotteries ... The
empirical evidence for the willingness of individuals to purchase lottery tickets, or en-
gage in similar forms of gambling, is extensive” (pp. 280, 286). While accepting, rather
than rejecting, small gambles directly questions the assumptions in Rabin (2000), we are
interested in the pattern of ﬁndings concerning the size of rR(w,u).
Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) investigate the decision of whether to purchase insurance
against the risk of telephone line trouble in the home using a structural logit model. The
price of this insurance was $0.45 a month, while the average cost of repair in case of trouble
was $55 and the probability of line trouble was 0.005. A 42.9% of users in the sample chose
not to buy insurance, so these users were taking a small gamble. Using data on monthly
income, they ﬁnd that observed behavior is consistent with expected utility in about 78%
of the households and support a utility speciﬁcation of the form u(w)=( w +0 .6)1−0.63.
The average income in the sample was 1.7 (in thousands). Correspondingly, the average
value found for rR(w,u)i s1.7·0.63
1.7+0.6 , and it is lying between 0 and 1 for most individuals.
Evans and Viscusi (1991) estimate state-dependent utility functions on risk-dollar
tradeoﬀs for minor health hazards in the reported use of insecticides and toilet bowl clean-
ers. In the no-injury state the Bernoulli utility function that they specify is ln(w). With
small probability (15n/10000, where n is the number of units of the product consumed
annually, ranging between 1.5 and 6), the use of the products they consider in their sample
may cause some minor health hazard. In these injury states, two alternative speciﬁcations
for the Bernoulli utility function are postulated: αln(w) and ln(w −L). The results of the
analysis provide overwhelming support of the latter speciﬁcation, and the authors inter-
pret this ﬁnding as consumers identifying the minor health hazard with a loss in income.
The average annual income in their sample is about $30,000. Although given the state-
6dependence of utility, it is not possible to come up with an overall value of rR(w,u), this is
obviously 1 for risks within the no-injury state, and given their data, its average value in
the unhealthy states is at most 12/11: for risks within these states, rR(w,u)=w/(w − L)
and the parameter L is estimated to be at most around 2,500.
Miravete (2001) examines the behavior of individuals choosing among alternative local
telephone tariﬀs in Kentucky. Consumers must choose between two options: a ﬂat tariﬀ
option with unlimited usage for a $18.70 monthly fee, and a measured service option with
a $14.02 monthly fee, a $5 allowance, and subsequent costs per call that depend on their
time of the day, duration, and distance. Switching to a diﬀerent tariﬀ option can be made
every month. In the sample, the diﬀerence between the ex ante choice and the ex-post
right tariﬀ option is on average about $4.88 out of a representative $1,600 per capita
monthly income. Despite the fact that the magnitude of the diﬀerence in the costs of each
alternative are very small, consumers appear to respond in the very short term to these
small savings by switching options. Using panel data on individual actual and expected
usage distributions and tariﬀ choices, the results show that individuals who choose the ﬂat
tariﬀ can be characterized as risk neutral and those who choose the measured tariﬀ as risk
lovers.
Likewise, evidence on risk attitudes from natural experiments involving television game
shows estimate rR(w,u) to be in the single-digit range and often cannot reject the null
hypothesis that agents are risk neutral (see, for example, Metrick (1995)).
We next brieﬂy review the evidence from larger gambles in order to see whether data
sets dominated by modest-risk opportunities yield higher or lower estimates of risk aversion
than those dominated by larger-risk opportunities.
Mehra and Prescott (1985) quote several microeconometric studies of aggregate ﬂuc-
tuations of consumption and investment, the response of small countries’ balance of trade
to shocks, the behavior of farmers, portfolio holdings, and the study of life-cycle savings
behavior that obtain values of rR(w,u) between 0 and 2. These authors consider that
the studies they cite “constitute an a priori justiﬁcation for restricting the value of this
coeﬃcient to be a maximum of ten,” as they do in their study. Kocherlakotta (1996), in
7reviewing the research on the equity premium puzzle, quotes estimates obtained from ﬁ-
nancial market data and summarizes the current state of professional opinion in this ﬁeld:
“A vast majority of economists believe that values above 10 (or for that matter, above
5) imply highly implausible behavior on the part of individuals.” Luttmer (1996) shows
how single-digit values of rR(w,u) can explain the size of the equity premium taking into
account actual capital market frictions. Barsky et al. (1997) report the results of survey
questions designed to elicit measures of risk tolerance, time preference and intertemporal
substitution as part of the Health and Retirement Study. They obtain single-digit val-
ues of rR(w,u). Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) estimate a structural dynamic model of
agricultural investment behavior that incorporates income uncertainty and credit market
constraints using longitudinal household data on farm proﬁts, bullock stocks, and pump
sets. The value of rR(w,u) is precisely estimated to be 0.96. Binswager’s (1980) is also a
classic study with low-income farmers in Bangladesh that ﬁnds similar estimates. Many
other references with similar ﬁndings on the size of this coeﬃcient can be found in these
and other papers.
We thus consider that the experimental and empirical evidence conclusively indicates
the range of parameter values where it would be empirically relevant to calibrate attitudes
towards risk for gambles of diﬀerent size. We can safely take that range of preferences to
be those for which rR(w,u) is in the single-digit range.5
5A ﬁnal observation concerning the evidence is in order. While the theory usually focuses on life-time
wealth, empirical studies typically use per period data (e.g., monthly income, yearly consumption, and so
on). Under the standard assumption of time stationarity of preferences, one can easily show that estimates
of the preference parameters for the per period utility function correspond to those of the utility function
over life-time wealth. Moreover, as Rubinstein (2001) notes, “nothing in the von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) axioms dictates use of ﬁnal wealth levels ... vNM are silent about the deﬁnition of prizes ... The
deﬁnition of prizes as ﬁnal wealth levels is no less crucial to Rabin’s argument than the expected utility
assumption.” As a referee noted, it is certainly possible that subjects may view lab choice situations
and “short-term” problems in isolation, rather than in conjunction with other sources of income. This is
Rubinstein’s (2001) response to Rabin (2000).
83 Rejecting Small Gambles: Testable Implication
Rabin (2000) shows that if an individual is a risk averse expected utility maximizer and
rejects a given gamble of equally likely gain g and loss l, g>l , over a given range of
wealth levels, then he will reject correspondingly larger gambles of gain G and loss L.W e
investigate now the implication of the “rejecting small gambles” assumption.
For a decision maker with wealth level w and twice continuously diﬀerentiable Bernoulli
utility function u, denote the Arrow-Pratt coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion by rA(w,u)=
−
u00(w)
u0(w), with rR(w,u)=w·rA(w,u). We next show that the assumption that an expected
utility maximizer turns down a given gamble with gain g and loss l for a given range
of wealth levels implies that there exists a positive lower bound on rA(w,u). In fact,
this positive lower bound can be calculated exactly and, therefore, provides a testable
implication of the assumption.
Proposition. Let u satisfy non-increasing absolute risk aversion. Let I be an interval in
the positive real line. If for every w ∈ I,
1
2
u(w + g)+
1
2
u(w − l) <u (w),
there exists a∗ > 0 such that the absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient rA(w,u) is greater than
a∗ for all w ∈ I. Moreover, the highest such a∗ is the solution to the equation
f(a)=e
al + e
−ag − 2=0 .
Proof: Suppose not. Then, for every a>0 there exists w ∈ I such that rA(w,u) <a .
In particular, this holds for the unique a∗ > 0 solving the equation f(a) = 0. (By the
intermediate value theorem, note that a∗ is well deﬁned because f is continuous, f(0) = 0,
f(∞)=∞,f 0(0) < 0, f0(a)=leal − ge−ag is ﬁrst negative, vanishes at a single point and
is positive thereafter).
Consider the constant absolute risk aversion utility function v(w)=−e−aw for a<a ∗.
9For such a choice of a, f(a) < 0, i.e.,
e
al + e
−ag < 2,
or
1
2
￿
−e
−a(w−l)
￿
+
1
2
￿
−e
−a(w+g)
￿
> −e
−aw.
Thus, an individual with utility function v would agree to play the small-stakes lottery
with gain g and loss l starting from any wealth level w.
Denote by w0 ∈ I the wealth level for which rA(w0,u)=a. By non-increasing absolute
risk aversion, for w ∈ I, w ≥ w0, the individual with utility function v is at least as risk
averse as the one with utility function u. Therefore, using the well-known characterization
of comparisons of risk attitudes across individuals in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), it
follows that
1
2
u(w + g)+
1
2
u(w − l) >u (w)
for every w ∈ I, w ≥ w0, which is a contradiction.
The hypothesis of non-increasing absolute risk aversion is generally accepted. Note,
however, that it is not essential to the argument in the above proof. We use it only
in the last step to assert that the range of wealth levels over which the “rejecting the
small-stakes lottery” assumption is violated constitutes an interval of the form [w0,∞),
something stronger than we need. In the absence of the non-increasing absolute risk
aversion assumption, continuity of the utility function would suﬃce to obtain the same
result over some arbitrary interval. This would also be enough for our purposes.
Hence, contrary to several statements in Rabin (2000, 2001) and Rabin and Thaler
(2001), the conclusion to be drawn from this proposition is that the assumption of rejecting
the small-stakes gamble does go beyond the assumption of concavity of the Bernoulli utility
function. A positive lower bound on risk aversion is also assumed, and this bound is
independent of the interval I over which the assumption is made. This lower bound on the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion clearly increases when for a given small-stakes gamble
10we enlarge the interval I over which it should be rejected. This means for example that
the assumption that a given gamble is rejected for all wealth levels is incompatible with
the agent becoming risk neutral at some suﬃciently high level of wealth, feature shared by
a large class of concave utility functions. The proposition implies that rR(w,u) must go
to inﬁnity as wealth goes to inﬁnity.
4 Rejecting Small Gambles: Some New Calibrations
In this section we calibrate attitudes towards risk for gambles of diﬀerent size in the region
where the combination of prizes (which we will continue referring to as wealth) and the cur-
vature of the utility function yields empirically plausible parameter values. That is, having
turned the assumption of rejecting small gambles into an empirically testable proposition
we examine whether or not rejecting small gambles, when the coeﬃcient rR(w,u) is in
the single-digit range, induces paradoxical behavior. Although the point we are raising is
general, only for computational simplicity, we shall work with the class of CRRA (con-
stant relative risk aversion) Bernoulli utility functions u(w)=w1−γ
1−γ for γ ≥ 0. For this
utility function, rR(w,u)=γ. In order to facilitate comparison with the literature we next
consider calibrations based on gambles similar to Rabin (2000). This is the only reason to
use these gambles, in the absence of a clear deﬁnition of what it is a “small gamble.” One
can certainly argue that there is a great deal of subjectivity in evaluating the magnitude
of a gamble.6
The assumption of rejecting small-stakes gambles is generally made over a given range
of wealth levels. In Table I we calculate, for two small-stakes lotteries and for diﬀerent
values of γ, the largest wealth level at which an individual rejects the lotteries.
[Table I here]
6If one is to assume the rejection of an initial small gamble, this should hold with independence of how
it is presented (e.g., as the choice between telephone calling plans, as a minor health hazard, or as a choice
in a ﬁrst-price auction or a matching pennies experiment). As pointed out by a referee, the fact that it is
diﬃcult to say what “small” or “large” stakes are suggests a possible role for reference points.
11Note that the values of these wealth levels are extremely small. Therefore, the empirical
relevance of the assumption, for decision makers with γ in the single digits, would seem to
be quite limited.
Continuing with the speciﬁcation of CRRA utility, the next question we examine is
how high is the bound a∗ associated with the given small-stakes lottery of gain g and loss
l. On the basis of the same lotteries used in Rabin’s (2000) Tables I and II, we calculate
in Table II their corresponding values of a∗, as deﬁned in the proposition above. The table
also shows, for wealth levels of $300,000 and $30,000, the induced values of γ.
[Table II here]
It is ﬁrst worth noting that for the wealth level of $300,000 very few values of γ are in
the single-digit range, or even in the teens. No single-digit value arises when the gamble
involves losing $100 or $1,000. Only when the rejected gamble involves losing l = $10,000,
which would not appear to be a small-stakes gamble, such low values start to arise consis-
tently. In an attempt to generate more γ coeﬃcients in the single-digit range, we examine
the same lotteries for a wealth level as extremely low as $30,000. In this case, single-digit
coeﬃcients arise for some gambles where l =$ 1 ,000, and for all gambles where l = $10,000,
which are hardly small-stake gambles for an individual with that wealth level. For the low-
est stakes gambles involving l = $100 a single-digit γ is only found when g = 101. We
conclude from Table II that empirically plausible, single-digit values of γ are compatible
with the assumption only when the loss l in the gamble is a signiﬁcant proportion of the
individual’s wealth. We thus learn that the assumption of rejecting truly small gambles
does not hold, when applied to all the decision makers that are behind the experimental
and empirical evidence mentioned above.
Finally, for various lotteries in Table II that yield values of γ in the single-digit range,
Table III displays the best large-stakes lottery with gain G and loss L that the decision
maker would reject.
[Table III here]
12It is apparent that these rejections are no longer paradoxical. For instance, for a
wealth of $300,000 the agent turns down gambles involving losses L ranging from 5 to
15 percent of his wealth and gains G that appear reasonable. The same can be said for
a wealth of $30,000. In this case, note that relative to wealth these values of L are ten
times greater than those in Rabin (2000). Thus, not even for these much larger gambles
paradoxical behavior is obtained. Finally, it is worth stressing that gambles with G = ∞
are turned down only when potential losses L represent a signiﬁcantly great proportion of
the individual’s wealth.
The reasonable behavior described in these large-stakes gambles contrasts with the
paradoxes in Rabin (2000) and in other authors in the literature, and indeed may be viewed
as a further conﬁrmation of the empirical soundness of single-digit values for rR(w,u).
These results refute assertions such as “paradoxical implications are not restricted to
particular contexts or particular utility functions,” or “within the expected-utility frame-
work, for any concave utility function, even very little risk aversion over modest stakes
implies an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes” (Rabin (2001, p. 203)). That
is, much more than “very little risk aversion over modest stakes” is needed to generate
paradoxical behavior. Indeed, this is only obtained when calibrations are made in a region
of the parameter space that is not empirically relevant.
Lastly, it is important to note that a rather straightforward empirical implication of the
calibrations made in Rabin (2000), under his belief that the assumption of rejecting small
gambles holds, is that “when measuring risk attitudes maintaining the expected-utility
hypothesis ... data sets dominated by modest-risk investment opportunities are likely to
yield much higher estimates of risk aversion than data sets dominated by larger investment
opportunities” (Rabin (2000, p. 1287)). But as already discussed in Section 2, contrary to
this implication, the empirical evidence gathered from many diﬀerent studies consistently
obtains estimates of rR(w,u) that vary very little across a wide heterogeneity of scales of
risk, as these estimates are narrowly conﬁned to the single-digit range.
135 Concluding Remarks
Using a problem posed to one of his colleagues as a starting point, Samuelson (1963)
argues that, under expected utility, the rejection of a given single gamble for all wealth
levels implies the rejection of the compound lottery consisting of the single gamble being
repeated an arbitrary number of times. Samuelson’s exercise sheds light on the fact that
some decision makers may be misapplying the law of large numbers when accepting a
compound lottery (the colleague’s response was that he would reject the single lottery,
but accept its compound version). However, Samuelson was clearly aware of the crucial
importance of the assumption of rejecting the single lottery for all wealth levels or a large
range thereof: “I should warn against undue extrapolation of my theorem. It does not say
that one must always refuse a sequence if one refuses a single venture: if, at higher income
levels the single tosses become acceptable, and at lower levels the penalty of losses does not
become inﬁnite, there might well be a long sequence that it is optimal” (p. 112). Indeed, it
may very well be the case that Samuelson’s colleague was not fooled by any fallacy of large
numbers. He simply violated the assumption of rejecting the given small-stakes lottery for
all wealth levels or large range thereof.
The main advantage of expected utility is its simplicity and its usefulness in the analysis
of economic problems involving uncertainty. As often argued in the literature, its predic-
tions sometimes conﬂict with people’s behavior. This has led economists to develop various
non-expected utility models which can often accommodate actual behavior better. The
non-expected utility research agenda is an important one, and there is no question that
we should continue to pursue it. However, expected utility should not be accused when
it is not at fault. The analysis in this paper shows how certain paradoxical examples in
the literature are many times counterfactuals. Paradoxical behavior is only obtained when
calibrations are made in a region of the parameter space that is not empirically relevant.
In a more recent paper, Rabin and Thaler (2001) continue to drive home the theme of the
demise of expected utility and compare expected utility to a dead parrot from a Monty
Python show. To the extent that all their arguments are based on the calibrations in Rabin
14(2000), the expected utility parrot may well be saying that “the report of my death was
an exaggeration.”
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TABLE I 
 
Wealth levels at which an individual with CRRA (g) utility 
function stops rejecting a 50-50 lose $100 / gain $g lottery. 
 
                    g 
           
g          125     110     
_______________________________  
 
2         400     1,000 
3      1,501.3    3,300.5 
4      2,003.1    4,401.2 
5      2,504.9    5,502 
6      3,006.9    6,602.7 
7      3,508.8    7,703.5 
8      4,010.8    8,804.3 
9      4,512.8    9,905.1 
10      5,014.9  11,006 
11      5,516.9  12,106.8 
12      6,018.9  13,207.6 
20    10,035.4  22.014.2 
30    15,056   33,022.5 
40    20,076.7  44,030.8 
50    25,097.3  55,039.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
TABLE II 
 
Lower bounds on the coefficient of absolute risk aversion for an individual that rejects a 
50-50 lottery lose $l / gain $g (a*) for any range of wealth levels, and associated lower 
bound on the coefficient of relative risk aversion for wealth levels $300,000 and $30,000. 
 
 
 
     l / g           a*        g = 300,000a*     g = 30,000a* 
           __________________________________________________________ 
 
100 / 101    .0000990      29.7      2.9 
100 / 105    .0004760    142.8    14.2 
100 / 110    .0009084    272.5    27.2 
100 / 125    .0019917    597.5    59.7 
100 / 150    .0032886    986.5    98.6 
 
1,000 / 1,050    .0000476      14.2      1.4 
1,000 / 1,100    .0000908      27.2      2.7 
1,000 / 1,200    .0001662      49.8      4.9 
1,000 / 1,500    .0003288      98.6      9.8 
1,000 / 2,000    .0004812    144.3    14.4 
 
10,000 / 11,000  .0000090       2.7      0.2 
10,000 / 12,000  .0000166       4.9      0.4 
10,000 / 15,000  .0000328       9.8      0.9 
10,000 / 20,000  .0000481     14.4      1.4 
 
  
 
TABLE III 
 
If averse to 50-50 lose $l / gain $g for wealth levels $300,000 and $30,000  
with CRRA utility and coefficient of relative risk aversion g, will also turn  
down a 50-50 lose L / gain G bet; G’s entered in Table. 
 
 
   Wealth: $30,000                   Wealth: $300,000 
 
     l/g:    100/101    1,000/1,050  1,000/1,100          l/g:    10,000/11,000  10,000/12,000 
    g:    2.9    1.4    2.7           g:    2.7    4.9   
                                   ________________________________                                                         _____________________ 
    L                       L 
400    416    ---    ---        15,000   17,341   19,887  
600    636    ---    ---        17,000   20,072   23,572  
800    867    ---    ---        20,000   24,393   29,792  
1,000    1,107    ---    ---        22,000   27,435   34,490  
2,000    2,479    2,205    2,439        25,000   32,266   42,574  
4,000    6,538    4,917    6,259        30,000   41,116   59,870  
6,000    14,538   8,329    13,168       40,000   62,594   126,890 
8,000    40,489   12,749   30,239       50,000   91,268   J     
10,000   J    18,686   495,319      75,000   239,089  J     
 
 